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Abstract
Network analysis of social media provides an important new lens on politics, communica-
tion, and their interactions. This lens is particularly prominent in fast-moving events, such as
conversations and action in political rallies and the use of social media by extremist groups to
spread their message. As an example of these ideas, we study the Twitter conversation following
the August 2017 ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA using tools from net-
work analysis and data science. We use media followership on Twitter and principal component
analysis (PCA) to compute a ‘Left’/‘Right’ media score on a one-dimensional axis to charac-
terize nodes. We then use these scores, in concert with retweet relationships, to examine the
structure of a retweet network of approximately 300,000 accounts that communicated with the
#Charlottesville hashtag. The retweet network is sharply polarized, with an assortativity coef-
ficient of 0.8 with respect to the sign of the media PCA score. Community detection using two
approaches, a Louvain method and InfoMap, yields communities that tend to be homogeneous
in terms of Left/Right node composition. We also examine centrality measures and find that
hyperlink-induced topic search (HITS) identifies many more hubs on the Left than on the Right.
When comparing tweet content, we find that tweets about ‘Trump’ were widespread in both the
Left and Right, though the accompanying language (i.e., critical on the Left, but supportive on
the Right) was unsurprisingly different. Nodes with large degrees in communities on the Left
include accounts that are associated with disparate areas, including activism, business, arts and
entertainment, media, and politics. Support of Donald Trump was a common thread among
the Right communities, connecting communities with accounts that reference white-supremacist
hate symbols, communities with influential personalities in the alt-right, and the largest Right
community (which includes the Twitter account FoxNews).
Keywords: United States politics, political extremism, media polarization, social media, Twit-
ter, community structure, principal component analysis
1 Introduction
On 11–12 August 2017, a ‘Unite the Right’ rally was held in Charlottesville, Virginia, USA in the
context of the removal of Confederate monuments from nearby Emancipation Park. Attendees at
the rally included members of the ‘alt-right’, white supremacists, Neo-Nazis, and members of other
far-right extremist groups [1]. Violent clashes between protesters and counter-protesters ensued.
A prominent event amidst these clashes was the death of Heather Heyer when a rally attendee
rammed his car into a crowd of counter-protesters [2]. In the aftermath, President Donald Trump
stated that there were ‘very fine people on both sides’ [3]. White supremacists were galvanized
by Trump’s response, with one former leader stating that the president’s comments marked “the
most important day in the White nationalist movement” ( [4], p. 61). Reactions to the removal
of confederate statues, the violence at the rally, and President Trump’s controversial response
generated vigorous debate across the United States.
In the present paper, we examine the structure of the online conversation surrounding the Au-
gust 2017 events in Charlottesville as a case study of applying a network-science lens to the study
polarization in online communication. Using tools from network analysis and data science, we
examine Twitter data, from communication following the ‘Unite the Right’ rally, that includes the
hashtag #Charlottesville. Our specific objectives are to (1) present a simple approach for charac-
terizing Twitter accounts based on their online media preferences; (2) use this characterization to
examine the extent of polarization in the Twitter conversation about Charlottesville; (3) evaluate
whether key accounts were particularly influential in shaping this discussion; (4) identify natural
groupings (in the form of network ‘communities’) of accounts based on their Twitter interactions;
and (5) characterize these communities in terms of their account composition and tweet content.
2
Social media platforms are important mechanisms for shaping public discourse, and data anal-
ysis of social media is a large and rapidly growing area of research [5]. It has been estimated that
almost two-thirds of American adults use social media networking sites [6], with even higher usage
among certain subsets of the population (such as activists [7] and college students [6]). Online
forums and social media platforms are also significant mechanisms for communication, dissemina-
tion, and recruitment for various types of ethnonationalist and extremist groups [4]. Twitter, in
particular, has been a key platform for white-supremacist efforts to shape public discourse on race
and immigration ( [4], p. 64).
As a network, Twitter encompasses numerous types of relationships. It is common to analyze
them individually as retweet (e.g., see [8,9]), follower (e.g., see [10]), mention (e.g., see [8]) networks,
and others. An extensive literature is concerned with Twitter network data, and the myriad
topics that have been studied using them include political protest and social movements [11–
17], epidemiological surveillance and monitoring of health behaviors [18–24], contagion and online
content propagation [25,26], identification of extremist groups [27], ideological polarization [8,28,29],
and much more. Indeed, the combination of significance for public discourse, data accessibility, and
amenability to network analysis is appealing. However, important concerns have been raised about
biases in Twitter data [13, 30, 31] in general and hashtag sampling in particular [5], and should be
kept in mind when interpreting the findings of both our study and others.
The study of how the internet and social media platforms affect public discourse is an extensive
research area [32–34]. In principle, social media and online news consumption have the potential to
increase exposure to disparate political views [35]. However, in practice, they instead often serve as
filter bubbles [36, 37] and echo chambers [33, 34]; and they thus potentially heighten polarization.
Several previous studies have examined political homophily in Twitter networks [8, 10, 29, 38, 39],
including with analysis based on tweet content and followership of political accounts [10]. We also
examine political polarization using Twitter data, but we take a different approach: we focus on
the homophily of media preferences on Twitter. Specifically, we examine media followership on
Twitter and perform principal component analysis (PCA) [40] to calculate a scalar measure of
media preference. We then use this scalar measure to characterize accounts in our Charlottesville
Twitter data set. To study homophily, we examine assortativity of this scalar quantity for accounts
that are linked by one or more retweets.
The influence of Twitter accounts on shaping content propagation and online discourse depends
on many factors, including the number of ‘followers’ (accounts who subscribe to a given account’s
posts, which then appear in their feed), community structure and other aspects of network archi-
tecture [26], account characteristics such as tweet activity [11], and specific tweet content [41]. One
can calculate ‘centrality’ measures [42] to identify important nodes in a Twitter network. There are
many notions of centrality, including degree, PageRank [43], betweenness [44], hyperlink-induced
text search (HITS, which allows the examination of both hubs and authorities) [45], and more.
In the context of our study, it is also useful to keep in mind that some structural features are
particular to Twitter networks, and these may influence which centrality measures are most appro-
priate to consider. Prominent examples of such features include asymmetry between the numbers
of followers and accounts being followed for many accounts [41], automated accounts (‘bots’) that
may retweet at very high frequencies [46], and heterogeneous retweeting properties across different
accounts [9]. The importance of such features has also led to the development of Twitter-specific
centrality measures [9, 47, 48]. We examine a variety of different measures of centrality for the
#Charlottesville retweet network to identify important accounts both for generating novel content
and for spreading existing content.
Community detection, in which one tries to find dense sets (called ‘communities’) of nodes that
are connected sparsely to other dense sets of nodes, is another approach that can give insights
3
into network structure (especially at large scales) [49,50]. Communities in a network can influence
dynamical processes, such as content propagation [26, 51, 52]. Investigating community structure
and other large-scale network structures can be very useful for the study of online social networks,
as some accounts are anonymous and demographic data may be incomplete or of questionable
validity. Community detection yields tightly-knit groupings of accounts that can help reveal what
segments of the population are engaged in a conversation on Twitter. One can then examine such
groupings, in conjunction with other tools from network analysis, to characterize communities in
terms of structural network properties (e.g., distributions of degree or other centrality measures)
and/or metadata (e.g., profile information), identify influential accounts within communities, and
study dynamical processes on a network (such as how content propagates both within and between
communities [26]).
In the present paper, we combine community detection with analysis of tweet content within
and across communities. Previous studies have reported differences in language between online
communities [53]. Such differences can help reveal differences in demography, political affiliation,
and views on specific topics [8, 10, 54]. For example, the ‘linguistic framing’ of issues such as
immigration can help reveal political orientations and agendas [55, 56], and changes in language
over time can reflect political movements and influence campaigns [57]. We combine community
detection with tweet content analysis to compare subsets of the Twitter population who participated
in the #Charlottesville conversation by characterizing them based on the language in different
communities for describing both the broader conversation topic (namely, #Charlottesville) and
specific subtopics (e.g., ‘Trump’).
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss our Twitter data collection and
cleaning. In Section 3, we discuss the media preferences that we infer from our Twitter data. In
Section 4, we examine the structure (in terms of both centrality measures and large-scale community
structure) of a network of retweet relationships that we construct from these data. In Section 5,
we examine the media-preference assortativity of nodes in the network. In Section 6, we compare
the content of tweets from nodes on the ‘Left’ (specifically, nodes with a negative media-preference
score) and those on the ‘Right’ (specifically, nodes with a positive media-preference score). In
Section 7, we conclude and discuss our results.
2 Data collection
We collected Tweets with the hashtag #Charlottesville and the follower lists for 13 media orga-
nizations using Twitter’s API and the Python package tweepy. Public data accessibility through
Twitter’s API has greatly facilitated research studies on Twitter data, but such data have im-
portant limitations [5, 13], including potential biases due to Twitter’s proprietary API sampling
scheme [13]. For example, Morstatter et al [31] illustrated that the API can produce artifacts in
topical tweet volume, potentially resulting in misleading changes in the number of tweets on a given
topic over time. In our analysis, we do not consider changes in tweet volume over time; instead, we
examine features of the data after aggregating over a collection-time window. Tu¨fekci [5] discussed
several potential issues with hashtag sampling, including different hashtag usages across different
groups and discontinuation of a given hashtag once the corresponding topic has been established.
(This latter phenomenon is called ‘hashtag drift’ [58].) We collected the tweets that we study from
a six-day period from shortly after the ‘Unite the Right’ rally; this should lessen the potential
for hashtag drift. As was pointed out by Tu¨fekci [5], hashtag sampling draws from accounts that
choose to tweet a given hashtag, and this necessarily entails biases. Nevertheless, hashtag sampling
is able to provide valuable insights on the shape of online conversations. For example, we can use
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the collected data to examine what types of accounts chose to post tweets about #Charlottesville.
It is known, for example, that the extent that ‘peripheral’ accounts engage in online conversations
about social protest can be an important factor for content propagation on Twitter [11].
Our data collection is in accord with the Twitter Terms of Service and Developer Agreement. To
protect user privacy, we include account names (i.e., “handles”) only for Twitter-verified accounts
and Twitter accounts that belong to organizations. As described by Twitter, “an account may be
verified if it is determined to be an account of public interest” [59].
2.1 Tweets about #Charlottesville
We used Twitter’s search API to sample 486,894 publicly available tweets that include the hashtag
#Charlottesville and were sent by 270,975 unique accounts between 16 August 2017 and 21 August
2017. Our data includes account name (i.e., “handle”), time and date in coordinated universal time
(UTC), and tweet content. In UTC, the earliest tweet date is 2017-08-16 22:16:21, and the latest
tweet date is 2017-08-20 01:48:00. We performed our data acquisition using the Python package
tweepy.
2.2 Media followership
In December 2016, we used the Twitter API to acquire the complete lists of Twitter users who follow
the following 13 media accounts: BreitbartNews, DRUDGE REPORT, FiveThirtyEight, FoxNews,
MotherJones, NPR, NRO1, WSJ2, csmonitor, dailykos, theblaze, thenation, and washingtonpost.
At the time of access, these media accounts had significant Twitter followings, ranging from 62,078
followers (csmonitor) to more than 12 million followers (WSJ); and they include both sources that
studies have concluded as preferred by conservative readers and those that they have concluded as
preferred by liberal ones [60,61].
3 Twitter media preferences
Of the Twitter accounts in our #Charlottesville data set, 99,412 accounts followed at least 1 of the
13 media sources at the time (December 2016) that we accessed the media follower lists. Restricting
to these accounts gives a 99,412× 13 media-choice matrixM of 0 entries (not following) and 1 entries
(following). We perform principal-component analysis (PCA) on M , and we highlight the first three
components in Table 1.
We interpret the first component as encoding liberal versus conservative media preference,
as reflected by the signs of the entries of this component. Specifically, media accounts with a
positive first component seem to correspond to accounts that previous studies have found to have
a conservative slant (and to be preferred by individuals who identify as conservative), whereas
accounts with a negative first component correspond predominantly to accounts that studies have
concluded to have a liberal slant and/or are preferred by liberals [60, 61]. The sign of the first
principal component is also consistent with conventional wisdom about liberal versus conservative
leanings of these media accounts, with the exception of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), which
is widely considered to be conservative-leaning [33] but has a negative first component in our
PCA. However, our findings are consistent with previous studies that, based on readership and
co-citations, grouped The Wall Street Journal with liberal media organizations [33, 62, 63]. By
contrast, previous research that examined article content identified The Wall Street Journal as
1NRO is the Twitter account for The National Review.
2WSJ is the Twitter account for The Wall Street Journal.
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Media account 1st 2nd 3rd
BreitbartNews 0.4071 0.2093 0.2691
DRUDGE REPORT 0.3843 0.2775 0.3131
FoxNews 0.3779 0.3652 −0.0220
theblaze 0.2054 0.2236 0.1615
NRO 0.0970 0.1826 0.0985
csmonitor −0.0235 0.0358 0.0356
WSJ −0.1183 0.5802 −0.3376
FiveThirtyEight −0.1520 0.0450 0.1785
dailykos −0.1893 0.0727 0.3414
thenation −0.2362 0.1279 0.4038
MotherJones −0.3115 0.0713 0.5159
washingtonpost −0.3321 0.4992 −0.2887
NPR −0.3945 0.2159 0.1303
Table 1: First three principal components of the media-followership matrix M . In combination,
these components explain 43% of the variance, with 25% from the first component, 17% from the
second component, and 11% from the third component. The red entries designate a positive entry
in the first component, and the bold entries designate a negative entry in the third component.
politically conservative [60]. Although the sign of the first component has a clear interpretation,
the magnitude of these entries does not appear to provide an intuitive ordering (for example, with
respect to a hand-curated media bias chart [64]) on the liberal–conservative spectrum.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the value of the first principal component; for simplicity,
we use the term ‘media PCA score’ to refer to this score. Positive values for this score indicate
followership of the media accounts that we show in red, whereas negative values indicate followership
of accounts that we show in black (see Table 1). To frame our discussion, we refer to nodes with a
positive media PCA score as nodes on the ‘Right’ and to those with a negative media PCA score
as being on the ‘Left’, although we note that we have not validated this measure as an indicator of
political belief or affiliation. Our approach is similar to that of Bail et al. [32], who applied PCA
to followership of a large set of ‘opinion leaders’ to assess political orientation.
4 Network structure
Let G˜ denote our retweet network, which is a weighted, directed graph with weighted adjacency
matrix A˜, where A˜ij denotes the number of times that node j retweeted node i. The graph
G˜ has 238,892 nodes, 365,589 edges (ignoring weights), and 389,736 retweets. We focus on G,
the largest connected component of G˜ when we ignore directionality (so it is G˜’s largest weakly
connected component). The graph G has 221,137 nodes, 353,548 edges (ignoring weights), and
376,978 retweets. Let A denote the weighted adjacency matrix for G. In all cases, weights represent
multi-edges.
4.1 Degree distribution
Let the out-degree of node k correspond to the total number of retweets posted by node k, and
the in-degree of k correspond to the total number of times that node k was retweeted. Unless
we specifically note otherwise, we include weights when calculating the in-degrees and out-degrees
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(a) In-degree distribution (b) Out-degree distribution
Figure 1: Degree distributions for the retweet network G. In-degree represents the number of
times that a node was retweeted, and out-degree represents the number of times that a node sent
a retweet. The two distributions differ from each other, with the in-degree distribution having a
longer tail (corresponding to a few accounts that were retweeted very heavily).
(i.e., we count all edges in a multi-edge). For example,
∑n
i=1Aij gives the out-degree of node j,
and
∑n
j=1Aij gives the in-degree of node i. In Figure 1, we show the in-degree and out-degree
distributions for G. The two distributions are rather different from one another, as the in-degree
distribution has a much longer tail (corresponding to a few accounts that were retweeted very
heavily).
In Figure 2a, we show the in-degrees for the twenty most heavily retweeted accounts. The
mean in-degree is 1.70, and the standard deviation is 69.22, indicating extreme heterogeneity in
the number of times retweeted. The account (RepCohen) with the largest in-degree was retweeted
16,180 times. By contrast, 208,241 nodes (i.e., 94% of them) in G were never retweeted at all. We
also observe heterogeneity in the out-degree, but it is much less extreme than for in-degree, as the
standard deviation is 4.89. (By definition, the mean in-degree and mean out-degree are the same,
as every edge has both an origin and terminus in G.) The account with the largest out-degree sent
141 retweets in our data set. By contrast, 7,852 accounts had an out-degree of 0; these accounts
were retweeted, but they did not retweet any accounts. In Figure 2b, we show the twenty accounts
that sent the most retweets.
We also consider the in-degree and out-degree distributions for accounts with and without media
PCA scores to examine whether there are systematic differences between the two types of accounts.
The heterogeneity for the in-degree distribution that we observed when examining all nodes in G
is also present when we consider the in-degree distribution separately for nodes with and without
media PCA scores; the standard deviation is 105.24 for nodes with media PCA and 36.65 for nodes
without it. The mean in-degree for nodes with a media PCA score is larger than for nodes without
one (2.85 versus 1.08). Nodes with large in-degree with media PCA scores include DineshDSouza,
pastormarkburns, RepCohen, wkamaubell, johncardillo, and many others. However, there are
also some heavily retweeted nodes — such as larryelder, TheNormanLear, and NancyPelosi —
that do not follow any of the 13 media accounts that we used for computing media PCA scores.
We thus cannot compute media PCA scores for these nodes.
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Figure 2: The 20 nodes that (a) were retweeted the most (i.e., with the largest in-degrees) and
(b) posted the most retweets (i.e., with the largest out-degrees). In each case, we also show the
corresponding in-degrees and out-degrees, respectively. The largest in-degrees are much larger
than the largest out-degrees, although the vast majority (94%) of nodes were never retweeted at
all. We show the account names (i.e., handles) for verified accounts on the vertical axes. Blank
labels correspond to accounts that are not verified. Note that the majority of accounts in panel (a)
correspond to verified accounts, whereas none of the nodes that sent the most retweets (i.e., the
accounts in panel (b)) are verified accounts.
4.2 Centralities
We now examine important accounts by computing several centrality measures. We start with
degree (i.e., degree centrality), the simplest way of trying to measure a node’s importance. In
Figure 2, we show the twenty nodes with the largest in-degrees and the twenty nodes with the
largest out-degrees. These two sets are disjoint, indicating that the nodes that generated most of
the original content in the Twitter conversation about #Charlottesville were distinct from those
that were most active in promoting existing content through retweets. Degree is a local centrality
measure that does not take into account any characteristics of neighboring nodes. For comparison,
we also calculate two additional widely-used centrality measures, PageRank [43] and HITS [45],
that take some non-local information into account.
PageRank corresponds to the stationary distribution of a random walk on a network that com-
bines transitions according to network structure and ‘teleportation’ according to a user-supplied dis-
tribution [65], with a parameter that determines the relative weightings of these two processes. We
compute PageRank with standard uniform-at-random teleportation using Matlab’s centrality
function with the default damping factor of 0.85 (so teleportation occurs for 15% of the steps
in the associated random walk). In the left column of Figure 3, we list the twenty most central
nodes according to PageRank. Nine of the these nodes are also on our list of nodes with the
largest in-degrees. An exception is harikondobalu, which was retweeted only 38 times in our data
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set. The large PageRank value for harikondobalu, despite its small in-degree, reflects the fact
that harikondobalu was one of only two nodes that were retweeted by wkamaubell, which was
retweeted 8,582 times.
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Figure 3: The twenty mos central nodes in the largest weakly connected component of the retweet
network according to (left) PageRank, (center) authorities, and (right) hubs. Color corresponds
to the mean media PCA score for the community assignment of each node from modularity max-
imization using a Louvain method (see Section 4.3). Nodes that appear in more than one column
are linked by colored lines. There is overlap between the PageRank and Authority nodes, but these
two sets are disjoint from the Hub accounts. All of the leading hubs belong to communities with
negative (i.e., Left) mean media PCA scores.
Hub and authority centralities [45] are another useful set of centrality measures. Using the
HITS algorithm, one can simultaneously examine hubs and authorities. As discussed in [45], a good
hub tends to point to good authorities, and a good authority tends to have good hubs that point
to it. In the context of retweeting, we expect that accounts with large authority scores tend to
be retweeted by accounts with large hub scores, and we expect that good hub accounts tend to
retweet accounts that are good authorities. As in PageRank, the importances of adjacent nodes
influence a node’s hub and authority scores. Under our convention that the (i, j) entry of a graph’s
adjacency matrix corresponds to the edge weight from j to i, hub and authority scores correspond,
respectively, to the principal right eigenvectors of AtA and AAt. We compute hubs and authorities
using Matlab’s centrality function.
We list the twenty nodes with the largest authority and hub scores, respectively, in the center
and right columns of Figure 3. Color indicates the mean media PCA scores for the community
assignment of each account from modularity maximization using a Louvain method ( [66–68]; see
Section 4.3). Only two of the nodes among the top twenty authorities are in communities with pos-
itive (i.e., Right) media PCA scores; these accounts, pastormarkburns and DineshDSouza, belong
to two prominent conservative personalities. Neither pastormarkburns nor DineshDSouza were
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ever retweeted by any of the top 50 hubs. By contrast, all of the other authorities were retweeted
at least 3 times by the leading hubs. The hub scores for all nodes has a bimodal distribution,
with a clear separation between the nodes with small and large values (e.g., using 4 × 10−5 as a
threshold hub score). We refer to nodes with hub scores that are larger than 4 × 10−5 as ‘large
hub-score nodes’. Consider the set of nodes that retweeted DineshDSouza. Of these, the fraction
that are large hub-score nodes is 9.0×10−4. The fraction of nodes that retweeted pastormarkburns
that are large hub-score nodes is 1.0× 10−3. For comparison, the fraction of nodes that retweeted
itsmikebivins that are large hub-score nodes is 1.3×10−2. A few other examples of such fractions
are 0.05 for wkamaubell, 0.15 for tribelaw, and 1 for RepCohen.
As is standard for hub and authority scores, there are two qualitatively different ways for a node
to have a large authority score: it can either be retweeted many times (e.g., DineshDSouza), or it
can be retweeted by nodes with large hub scores (e.g., itsmikebivins). Both of the large-authority
Right accounts (DineshDSouza and pastormarkburns) lie in the former category.
Figure 3 also allows us to compare important accounts according to different centrality measures.
As one can see in Figure 3, there is some overlap between the top-PageRank and top-authority
accounts. Note, however, that fewer than half of the top-PageRank accounts are also among the
top-authority accounts. By comparison, the set of top hubs is disjoint from the top-PageRank and
top-authority accounts in Figure 3. Additionally, more than half of the top-PageRank and top-
authority accounts in Figure 3 are verified accounts, whereas none of the top-hub accounts were
verified.
4.3 Community structure
To examine large-scale structure in the #Charlottesville retweet network, we use community de-
tection to identify tightly-knit sets (so-called ‘communities’) of accounts with relatively sparse
connections between these sets [49, 50]. There exist numerous methods for community detection.
In our investigation, we employ two widely-used methods: modularity maximization [67, 68] and
InfoMap [69].
4.3.1 Modularity maximization
The modularity of a particular assignment of a network’s nodes into communities measures the
amount of intra-community edge weight, relative to what one would expect at random under some
null model [67, 68]. Modularity maximization then treats community detection as an optimiza-
tion problem by seeking an assignment of nodes into communities that maximizes the modularity
objective function. A version of modularity for weighted, directed graphs is [70,71]
(4.1) Q =
1
w
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
Aij − γ
wini w
out
j
w
)
δ(Ci, Cj) ,
where
(4.2) w =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Aij
is the sum of all edge weights in a network; wink and w
out
k are the in-strength (i.e., a weighted
generalization of in-degree) and out-strength (i.e., weighted out-degree), respectively, of node k; the
community assignment of node k is Ck; the quantity δ is the Kronecker delta; and γ is a resolution
parameter that controls the relative weight given to the null model [72]. Our null-model matrix
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elements are Pij =
wini w
out
j
w , so this null model is a type of configuration model [73], in which we
preserve expected in-strength and expected out-strength but otherwise randomize connections [49].
For simplicity, we use the resolution-parameter value γ = 1.
To maximize Q, we use a variant [74] (which is implemented in Matlab and was released
originally in conjunction with [75]) of the locally-greedy Louvain algorithm [66]. To use the Gen-
Louvain code in [74], we symmetrize the modularity matrix B, where Bij = Aij − γw
in
i w
out
j
w . As
discussed in [71], this is distinct from symmetrizing the adjacency matrix A.
Modularity maximization using GenLouvain yields 228 communities, which range in size from
2 nodes to 47,321 nodes.
4.3.2 InfoMap
InfoMap is a community-detection method that is based on the flow of random walkers on graphs
[69].3 The intuition for communities in methods based on random walks is that a random walker
tends to be trapped for long periods of time within tightly-knit sets of nodes [50]. Rosvall and
Bergstrom [69] made this idea concrete by trying to minimize the expected description length a
the random walk. For example, one can obtain a concise description of a random walk by allowing
node names to be reused between communities. One can apply InfoMap to weighted, directed
graphs; and it has been used previously to study Twitter data [26]. To study a directed graph, one
introduces a teleportation parameter (as in PageRank); we use the default teleportation value of
τ = 0.15 [69].
Our implementation uses code from [76]. With InfoMap, we find 205 communities, which range
in size from 1 node to 122, 504 nodes.
4.3.3 Large-scale structure of the retweet network
Several features are evident in our community-detection results from both modularity maximiza-
tion and InfoMap: (1) communities are largely segregated by media PCA score; (2) overall, the
communities skew towards the Left; and (3) most of the nodes on the Right are assigned to a large
community that includes prominent right-wing personalities and FoxNews.
To examine the relationship between community structure and Left/Right media preference,
we compute the mean media PCA score within each community. The proportion of communities
with at least one node with a media PCA score is very similar under modularity maximization
(204/228; 89%) and InfoMap (183/205; 89%). We also examine the extent of overlap of Left
and Right accounts within communities by computing the Shannon diversity index [77] for each
community. This index is given by
(4.3) Hk = −
2∑
i=1
pki ln p
k
i ,
where Hk is the Shannon diversity index for community k, and pk1 and p
k
2 (with p
k
1 + p
k
2 = 1
for each k) are the fractions of accounts in community k with Left and Right media preferences,
respectively. In Figure 4, we show the Shannon diversity scores versus mean media PCA scores for
the communities that we detect using modularity maximization and InfoMap.
Both community-detection methods yield a predominantly unimodal shape for PCA score di-
versity versus mean media PCA score, with more extreme mean media PCA scores associated with
3One can also interpret modularity maximization in terms of random walks on graphs [72].
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Shannon Diversity index for communities from (a) modularity maximization and (b) In-
foMap. The circle sizes correspond to the number of nodes in the communities. More extreme mean
media PCA scores are associated with lower diversity in a community, and the larger communities
tend to have smaller Shannon Diversities and more polarized media scores.
lower diversity within a community. Communities with ‘centrist’ mean media PCA scores (i.e., ones
that are near 0) have relatively small sizes. By contrast, the largest communities tend to have mean
media scores that are farther from 0, and have small Shannon diversity. For example, InfoMap gives
two communities that are much larger than the others. One is on the Left (with 122,504 nodes
and a mean media PCA score of −0.43), and the other is on the Right (with 58,185 nodes and a
mean media PCA score of 0.74. In these two communities, 91% of the nodes in the largest Left
community have negative media PCA scores, compared with 6% in the largest Right community.
Similarly, the large communities from modularity maximization also have little Left/Right node
diversity within communities.
Another prominent feature is that both community-detection approaches yield one community
on the Right that is much larger than other communities with a positive mean media PCA score.
Furthermore, the two methods are similar in terms of large-degree accounts in the largest Right
community from each method. Specifically, the five nodes with largest in-degrees and out-degrees
are the same, with DineshDSouza, pastormarkburns, larryelder, johncardillo, and FoxNews as
the five most heavily retweeted accounts (i.e., the ones with the largest in-degrees) in the community.
Figure 4 also suggests that there are more Left-leaning communities than Right-leaning ones.
For example, 106/130 (i.e., about 82%) of the InfoMap communities with at least ten nodes have
negative mean media PCA scores. Modularity maximization gives a bimodal distribution of com-
munity sizes, and we use a community size of 100 to distinguish between ‘small’ and ‘large’ commu-
nities. Of the large modularity-maximization communities, 76/93 (i.e., 82%) have negative mean
media PCA scores. For comparison, we have PCA scores for 78,339 nodes, and 44,797 of them
(about 57%) have a negative first PCA score.
4.3.4 Finer features of the retweet network
A difference between the two methods is that two large communities dominate for InfoMap (one
each on the Left and Right), whereas modularity maximization yields a partition of the network into
many more communities. We now examine some of these details focusing specifically on moderate
to large communities from modularity maximization.
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Modularity maximization yields 41 communities with at least 1,001 nodes. To further charac-
terize these 41 communities, we examine the accounts with largest in-degree (i.e., the ones that are
retweeted the most) within each community and characterize these nodes by hand from their pro-
files and, when available (e.g., when account owners are known public personalities), information
about the owners of these accounts. More than 85% (specifically, 35 of 41) of these communities
have negative (i.e., Left-leaning) mean media PCA scores. The accounts with the largest in-degrees
in these 35 communities include activists (e.g., Everytown, IndivisibleTeam, UNHumanRights,
and womensmarch), businesses (e.g., benandjerrys), people from arts and entertainment (e.g.,
jk rowling, LatuffCartoons, FallonTonight, ladygaga, Sethrogen, TheNormanLear, and wkamaubell),
journalists (e.g., AmyKNelson), media organizations (e.g., AJEnglish, CBSThisMorning, and HuffPostCanada),
and politicians (e.g., NancyPelosi, RepCohen, and JoeBiden). By comparison, only six of the
largest communities have positive (i.e., Right-leaning) mean media PCA scores. The largest of these
(with 47,321 nodes) includes opinion leaders on the Right (e.g., DineshDSouza, pastormarkburns,
and larryelder) and FoxNews, as we discussed previously. Another community has a mean PCA
score close to 0 (specifically, it is 0.086), and it appears to be a business-oriented community with
tweets that are critical of Donald Trump. Two of the remaining four communities with positive
media scores are Right-oriented activist communities. One activist community has 3, 987 nodes,
and one of its accounts of largest in-degree (i.e., that is retweeted very heavily) references an in-
fluential alt-right account [78]. The other activist community has 2,710 nodes and one of its most
retweeted accounts references a well-known white supremacist hate symbol in its handle. A third
community appears to be a media community with foreign media personalities (e.g., KTHopkins),
and the final community of these four is a community that is dominated by accounts that tweet in
German.
5 Media-preference assortativity
To examine homophily in media-preference scores in the Twitter conversation about #Char-
lottesville, we measure media-preference assortativity by computing the Pearson correlation co-
efficient of the first media PCA score for nodes in the retweet network. Specifically, we compute
the correlation of the first media PCA score for dyads (i.e., nodes that are adjacent to each other
via an edge) in the retweet network. We ignore edge weights, and we restrict our calculations to
dyads for which we have a PCA score for both nodes. There are 93,521 such pairs.
The correlation coefficient of the first media PCA scores is ρ ≈ 0.67. For comparison, we
compute the correlation coefficient distribution for 100,000 random permutations of the PCA scores
of the nodes. Specifically, in each realization, we fix the network and assign the PCA scores
uniformly at random to the nodes for which PCA scores were available originally. The resulting
distribution for the correlation coefficient ρ appears to be approximately Gaussian, with a mean of
−1.29×10−5 and a standard deviation of 0.0033. The z-score for the measured correlation coefficient
of 0.67 is larger than 203, indicating that the retweet network has a statistically significant media-
preference assortativity.
We also compute the assortativity coefficient r that was introduced by Newman [79,80]. Suppose
that there are g types of nodes in the network. Following [80], we calculate
(5.4) r =
∑g
`=1 e`` −
∑g
`=1 a`b`
1−∑g`=1 a`b` ,
where e`s is the fraction of the total edges that emanate from a node of type ` and terminate at a
node of type s, the quantity a` =
∑g
s=1 e`s is the fraction of total edges that emanate from a node
of type `, and bs =
∑g
`=1 e`s is the fraction of total edges that terminate at a node of type s.
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original
retweeter Left Right
Left 0.43 0.057
Right 0.044 0.47
Table 2: Mixing matrix of the proportion of total edge weight that corresponds to edges between
different types of accounts, as characterized by the sign of their media PCA score (i.e., first PCA
score). Left indicates a negative media PCA score, and Right indicates a positive media PCA score.
(No nodes have a media PCA score of exactly 0.) Accounts tend to mix with (i.e., be adjacent to)
accounts with a PCA score of the same sign, as indicated by the larger weights on the diagonal of
the matrix.
To calculate (5.4) for the retweet network, we classify nodes according to the sign of their
media PCA score. In the largest weakly connected component of the retweet network, we have
PCA scores for 78, 339 nodes, of which 44, 797 (i.e., 57% of them) have a negative first PCA
score. The resulting assortativity coefficient is r ≈ 0.80. We show the mixing matrix e in Table 2.
As a comparison, Newman [80] calculated an assortativity coefficient of 0.62 by ethnicity for the
sexual-partner network that was described in [81].
Five4 of the media accounts that we used to compute the media PCA score also appear as
nodes in the retweet network G. Of these, FoxNews was retweeted 3049 times, NPR was retweeted
69 times, MotherJones was retweeted 15 times, and csmonitor was retweeted 6 times.Removing
these media accounts from G has a negligible effect on the assortativity coefficient r.
Although the assortativity by PCA score in the retweet network is rather strong, there are
some prominent individual exceptions. For example, RepCurbelo and SenatorTimScott5, the
accounts for two Republican members of Congress, were heavily retweeted in Left-leaning com-
munities that we detected with modularity maximization. However, both RepCurbelo (0.49) and
SenatorTimScott (0.12) have positive (i.e., Right) media PCA scores, consistent with their affil-
iation with the Republican party. RepCurbelo was the fourth-most retweeted account in a com-
munity from modularity maximization with a negative (i.e., Left) mean media PCA score (−0.32).
RepCurbelo, who spoke out strongly against the events in Charlottesville [82], was retweeted by
22 accounts. We have PCA scores for 9 of these accounts, of which 4 have media PCA scores on
the Left. Similarly, SenatorTimScott was the second-most retweeted account in a Left-leaning
community (with a mean media PCA score of −0.26) that we obtained from modularity maximiza-
tion. SenatorTimScott was retweeted by 78 accounts, and nearly half (specifically, 20 of 43) of the
accounts that retweeted SenatorTimScott for which we have PCA scores have negative media PCA
scores. We identified RepCurbelo and SenatorTimScott as accounts that warrant examination by
first compiling the list of nodes that were retweeted by accounts with media PCA scores of the
opposite sign and then examining this list for prominent accounts. One can further develop this
approach (for example, to identify negative or mocking retweets [5]), and it may be useful in other
situations for identifying accounts that generate communication across ideological or other divides.
4Specifically, these are csmonitor, MotherJones, theblaze, FoxNews, and NPR.
5These are the Twitter accounts for Representative Carlos Curbelo (FL, Republican) and Senator Tim Scott (SC,
Republican).
14
6 Comparison of tweet content between Left and Right
We use the Python library nltk 3.3 to tokenize tweets into words and punctuation. In Table 3, we
show the twenty-five most numerous words in our data set, where we separately consider accounts
with negative (i.e., Left) and positive (i.e., Right) media PCA scores after removing stop words.6
Additionally, we do not stem the words in our data set, and we treat different capitalizations as
different words in our analysis. We find some overlap between the Left and Right data sets; for
example, tweets related to ‘Trump’ were very common regardless of media PCA score. ‘Barcelona’
was also one of the most numerous words in tweets that were sent by both the Left and the Right.
There was a 17 August 2017 van attack in that city that killed 13 individuals (at the time of data
collection) and injured more than 100 others.7 However, there are also many differences between
the two sets of words that we show in Table 3. We indicate these differences by coloring the relevant
words. For example, ‘Obama’ was the third-most numerous word in tweets that were sent by nodes
with positive media PCA scores, but it was not in the top one hundred for nodes with negative
media PCA scores. ‘Nazi’ appeared commonly in tweets from the Left, but it did not appear often
in tweets from the Right, whereas the words ‘Antifa’ and ‘MSM’ were used often by the Right but
not by the Left.
Left Right
Word Count Word Count
Charlottesville 98782 Charlottesville 84282
Trump 19352 Trump 11376
realDonaldTrump 10289 Obama 8195
white 9472 white 8174
Nazis 7743 DineshDSouza 8026
Nazi 6451 POTUS 7614
comments 5068 pastormarkburns 7394
charlottesville 4759 Barcelona 6348
good 4693 supremacist 6004
people 4637 organizer 5864
response 4091 rally 5851
must 4080 violence 5671
hate 3933 guy 5501
Barcelona 3930 MSM 5070
violence 3884 hate 4882
supremacy 3642 Right 4531
introducing 3584 city 4490
attack 3460 Americans 4489
via 3382 larryelder 4421
RepCohen 3358 Antifa 4409
rally 3345 Since 4183
Impeachment 3341 11 4011
Articles 3326 Chicago 3946
Klansmen 3310 Statues 3905
right 3155 40 3900
Table 3: The twenty-five most numerous words for nodes with negative (i.e., Left) and positive
(i.e., Right) media PCA scores. The blue text indicates words that appear in the top twenty for
the Left but not for the Right, and the red text indicates words that appear in the top twenty for
the Right but not for the Left.
We observe additional qualitative differences between the tweet content of the Left and Right
on shared common words, such as ‘Trump’ and ‘Barcelona’, in the #Charlottesville data set. The
‘Trump’ subset8 for which we have media PCA scores consists of 34,084 total tweets (of which
about 32% are unique) from the Left, and 18,791 total tweets (of which about 23% are unique)
from the Right.9 As we show in the left set of columns of Table 4, the Left and Right conversations
6We use stop words from the nltk Python library; and we also remove the following words when calculating word
counts: ‘t’, ‘https’, ‘co’, ‘RT’, ‘s’, ‘amp’, ‘n’, ‘w’, and ‘c’.
7One of those wounded individuals died later (after the time of data collection) from their injuries.
8The word ‘Trump’ was the most common word for both Left and Right after ‘Charlottesville’, which comes
directly from the hashtag that we used to generate the data set.
9Duplicates come, for example, from retweets.
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Left Right
Word Count Word Count
Charlottesville 30995 Charlottesville 16218
Trump 19396 Trump 11376
realDonaldTrump 10291 realDonaldTrump 3245
Nazis 5600 MAGA 1403
comments 4941 POTUS 1278
good 3788 President 1229
introducing 3580 Romney 1209
Impeachment 3331 comments 1175
white 3318 apologize 1164
Articles 3313 racist 1149
RepCohen 3306 blame 1096
Klansmen 3301 Mayor 1085
must 2699 antifa 980
Congress 2606 charlottesville 959
censure 2540 Vice 958
supremacy 2239 Barcelona 880
wake 2107 left 868
defense 2060 alt 818
NancyPelosi 2054 coming 781
repulsive 2018 non 776
Left Right
Word Count Word Count
Charlottesville 4213 Charlottesville 7384
Barcelona 3926 Barcelona 6345
attack 1023 Muslims 2101
Trump 1020 13 2036
terrorism 842 right 2035
2 665 CNN 2019
prayers 450 kills 2006
realDonaldTrump 438 condemned 2002
thoughts 420 kill 1996
Terror 415 someone 1977
gets 400 attack 1707
settle 399 left 1686
directed 399 lunatic 1632
scolding 399 One 1621
intentional 397 wholesale 1620
ambigu 395 johncardillo 1617
condemns 356 copycat 1190
took 346 Trump 718
comment 317 Blitzer 648
immediately 317 people 642
Table 4: The twenty most numerous words from the subset of tweets that include (left set of
columns) the word ‘Trump’ and (right set of columns) the word ‘Barcelona’, excluding words that
correspond to handles of non-verified accounts. The blue text indicates words that appear in the
top twenty words for the Left but not for the Right, and the red text indicates words that appear
in the top twenty for the Right but not for the Left.
about Trump differ markedly from each other. The ‘Barcelona’ subset consists of 4,779 tweets
(of which 1,672 are unique) from the Left and 7,669 tweets (of which 1,401 are unique) from the
Right’. In the right set of columns of Table 4, we show the twenty most numerous words for the
Barcelona subset for both Left and Right. For the Right, our examination of the most heavily
retweeted tweets suggests that much of the discussion about ‘Barcelona’ in our data set involves
comparing media coverage of the Charlottesville versus Barcelona attacks. On the Left, some of
the heavily retweeted tweets about ‘Barcelona’ centered on comparing Trump’s reaction to the
Barcelona versus Charlottesville attacks.
For comparison, Gentzkow and Shapiro [83] used a chi-square statistic to analyze the different
phrase usage of Democrats and Republicans in Congressional speeches. We apply their approach
to words in tweets from the Left and Right in the ‘Trump’ subset (specifically, using equation (1)
in [83] with ‘phrases’ that consist of a single word) and find that the five words (which include
‘Nazis’, ‘antifa’, and ‘Vice’) with the largest chi-square values were also among the most common
words (see Table 4). Therefore, we observe some consistency in results across different methods.
We also use hashtags to compare tweets between the Left and Right communities. In Figure 5,
we show the most numerous hashtag for each community,10 together with the community’s mean
media PCA score. On the Left, the most numerous hashtag is #Trump (in 13 of 35 communi-
ties), followed by #HeatherHeyer (in 5 of 35 communities, if we include a single community with
‘#HeatherHayer’) and then #Barcelona (in 4 of 35 communities). Other top hashtags include #Ex-
poseTheAltRight, #DumpTrump, #FightRacism, and #DisarmHate. On the Right, #Barcelona
is the most numerous hashtag (in 3 of 6 communities, if we include a single community with #Bar-
cellona). Other top hashtags on the Right are #UniteTheRight (from a community with an account
of large in-degree whose Twitter handle references an influential account that identifies with the
alt-right [78]) and #fakenews (from a community with an account of large in-degree whose handle
references a well-known white-supremacist hate symbol).
The Left and Right also have different fractions of tweets with unique content. Nodes with
negative media PCA scores sent a total of 112,314 tweets, of which 42,458 (i.e., about 38%) were
10This neglects hashtags that contain ‘Charlottesville’, as our data collection was based on the #Charlottesville
hashtag.
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Figure 5: Most numerous hashtags for communities from modularity maximization with at least
1,001 nodes. The mean media PCA score is on the horizontal axis (and is also indicated by the
color bar), and the number of nodes is on the vertical axis.
unique. Nodes with positive media PCA scores sent a total of 92,575 tweets, of which 22,462 (i.e.,
about 24%) are unique. We also observe a larger fraction of original content in the Left than in the
Right when restricting to several specific topics, including ‘Trump’ (32% for the Left versus 23%
for the Right), ‘Barcelona’ (35% for the Left versus 18% for the Right), ‘MSM’ (21% for the Left
versus 8% for the Right), ‘Obama’ (31% for the Left versus 7% for the Right), and ‘Antifa’ (50%
for the Left versus 22% for the Right). However, there are a slightly larger proportion of unique
tweets for the Right for tweets that include the word ‘Nazi’ (21% for Left versus 26% for Right).
7 Conclusions and discussion
Our investigation illustrates strong polarization in the Twitter conversation about #Charlottesville.
We found that media followership on Twitter is informative and that the #Charlottesville retweet
network is strongly assortative with respect to a corresponding PCA-based Left/Right orientation
score. Our finding of positive assortativity with respect to media preference on Twitter is consistent
with previous studies of Twitter data [8, 10, 38, 39]. Our approach of using a principal component
analysis of media followership to characterize nodes is simple and easy to interpret, and it provides
a valuable complement to characterizing nodes based on the content of their tweets. We found
that the #Charlottesville retweet network is strongly assortative with respect to media preference,
making this a potentially useful indicator of marked polarization on Twitter about the ‘Unite the
Right’ rally and its aftermath. Whether differences in media preferences are a cause or an effect
(or both) of assortativity on social media is not something that our approach allows us to conclude,
but they are correlated strongly with each other in our data.
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Polarization is also evident in the community structure of the retweet network, as the commu-
nities are highly segregated in terms of their Left/Right node composition. The Left has a larger
proportion of tweets with original content (as opposed to retweets) than the Right, and nodes with
large hub scores tended to retweet nodes on the Left rather than those on the Right. We addition-
ally find that modularity maximization detects Left communities with central nodes from disparate
focal areas such as business, media, entertainment, and politics.
On the Right, both employed community-detection methods identify a large community that
includes FoxNews and right-wing personas such as DineshDSouza, pastormarkburns, larryelder,
and johncardillo. Heavily retweeted posts from this community about #Charlottesville included
references to the mainstream media, Antifa, and Barack Obama. There were also many tweets that
referenced Trump, and ‘POTUS’ is the fifth11 most common word that was tweeted by members
of this community.
Note, however, that Twitter users are not a representative sample of the general population
[61], and hashtag sampling introduces its own set of biases [5]. Differences in Twitter usage and
propensity to tweet political content may also differ with political affiliation [10]. Consequently,
it is also important to compare our findings from Twitter to offline information. Our findings are
consistent with a Quinnipiac poll that suggested that nearly one third of Republicans (but only
4% of Democrats) considered counterprotesters to be more to blame than white supremacists for
the violence at Charlottesville [84]. We observe that several of the communities on the Right that
we obtained from modularity maximization of the #Charlottesville retweet network also appear to
reflect core participants of the ‘Unite the Right’ rally [1], as indicated by the referencing by central
nodes in these communities of white-supremacist hate symbols or influential personalities in the
alt-right.
Our analysis illustrated a stark distinction between Left and Right when we examined tweets
that include the word ‘Trump’, with criticism on the Left versus support on the Right (see Table
4). For example, the most numerous hashtags from the Left in tweets that include ‘Trump’ were
#Impeachment and #ImpeachTrump; by contrast, the most numerous hashtags were ‘#Barcelona’,
‘#MAGA’, and ‘#fakenews’ from accounts in communities on the Right. Our findings are consistent
with the extreme polarization and political tribalism in American society that have been described
by other studies [85–87]. Such societal divisions are apparent on Twitter, as documented both
by the present study and by prior ones [8, 10, 38, 39], including recent work that suggested that
polarization on Twitter is increasing over time [28].
It is also important to examine the role that fully automated accounts (‘bots’) and partially
automated accounts (which have been dubbed ‘cyborgs’ [88]) play in shaping conversations (espe-
cially political ones) on Twitter and other social media platforms [46,88–93]. Although an in-depth
analysis of the role of bots in the #Charlottesville discussion is beyond the scope of the present
paper, it is likely that many bot accounts are present in our data set. For example, automated
naming schemes have been noted as an indicator of bot accounts [89]; and naming schemes that
end in sequences of eight digits, as well as accounts that consist of hexadecimal strings, both exist
in the #Charlottesville data. Detailed investigation of these accounts and their behavior is an
important topic for future work. Sockpuppet accounts (i.e., false accounts that are operated by an
entity [94]), such as those that are operated by the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg,
Russia [95,96], can also play important roles in content propagation and thus warrant further inves-
tigation. Antipathy and distrust across party lines can provide opportunities for actors who seek to
fan societal divisions. For example, our data set includes tweets by prominent accounts operated
by the Internet Research Agency [95,96] that attacked both the Left and the Right.
11This excludes ‘Charlottesville’, as we based our data collection on the hashtag #Charlottesville.
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It would be interesting to apply our approach for analyzing the Twitter conversation about
#Charlottesville to also examine polarization on other topics (e.g., Brexit) and to see how polar-
ization across political divides and attempts to bridge them change over time. It is not clear whether
engagement with Twitter accounts with different viewpoints will decrease or increase polarization
on divisive topics. For example, the empirical results of Bail et al. [32] suggest that exposure
on Twitter to contrasting ideologies can lead to increased polarization. An interesting question
is how exposure shapes viewpoints of individuals with ‘centrist’ media preferences or ideologies.
Our investigation focused primarily on the sign of a media PCA score, but the underlying media
PCA score is continuous; and one can use it to examine media preferences in a more nuanced way.
In particular, characterization of accounts with moderate (‘Centrist’) media PCA scores, study of
network structure and tweet content by these nodes, and tracking the evolution of these charac-
teristics over time is both feasible and relevant. It would also be interesting to consider multiple
ideological dimensions (e.g., as in studies of voting by legislators on bills [97]) and to simultaneously
analyze multiple types of Twitter relationships as a muiltilayer network [98]. More broadly, we ex-
pect that our approach is generalizable other contexts, and it may be helpful for examining other
types of node characterization (such as by analyzing different media outlets or types of followed
accounts). To conduct increasingly nuanced investigations, it will also be worthwhile to study PCA
components other than the first one and to use other types of multidimensional-scaling techniques.
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